Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by Dwyer,, Thomas E., Jr. & Kiely, Stephen
California Western Law Review 
Volume 21 
Number 2 CIVIL RICO SYMPOSIUM Article 6 
1985 
Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act 
Thomas E. Dwyer, Jr. 
Stephen Kiely 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Dwyer,, Thomas E. Jr. and Kiely, Stephen (1985) "Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act," California Western Law Review: Vol. 21 : No. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
THOMAS E. DWYER, JR.*
STEPHEN KIELY**
INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years after its enactment, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act' ("RICO" or "the Act") has come full
circle. Although it was used sparingly at first, it is now so popular
with civil litigants that some courts have recently imposed restric-
tions which seem calculated primarily to control the explosion of
federal "RICO" litigation.2 In several cases courts have imposed
restrictive standing requirements which require the plaintiff to show
a "racketeering enterprise injury" in much the same fashion as the
antitrust laws require a competitive injury.3 Similarly, the Second
Circuit, in a controversial opinion, has decided that the predicate
acts of racketeering must have resulted in criminal convictions,
although not necessarily RICO convictions. 4 In great measure,
these decisions provide an example of the close statutory examina-
tion that counsel who seek to utilize civil RICO must undertake.
One of the most vexing problems today is whether the Act con-
templates true vicarious liability, in effect, civil liability based upon
the liability or fault of another.5 Put another way, the question is
whether the Act contemplates respondeat superior liability for a
principal whose agent has violated the statute while acting within
* Mr. Dwyer is the founding partner of the Boston, Massachusetts law firm of
Dwyer & Murray; B.S., Boston College, 1967; J.D., Suffolk University Law School,
1970; former Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County District Attorney's Office,
Boston, 1972-1978, Project Director, Investigation and Prosecution Project which fo-
cused on organized and white collar crime.
** Mr. Kiely practices with the law firm of Dwyer & Murray, Boston Massachu-
setts; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1972; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1975; former
Assistant District Attorney and Chief of Investigations Unit, Essex County District
Attorney's Office, 1979-1982.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
2. See Weissman, Circuit Aims to Curb Private Civil RICO Actions, Legal Times,
Aug 20, 1984, at 12, col. 1; Comment, RICO and Securities Fraud: 4 Workable Limita-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513, 1517 n.28 (1983); and Comment, RICO: The Tempta-
tion and Impropriety of Judicial Resolution, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982).
3. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984), pet. for
cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1984) (No. 84-657).
4. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 482, 503 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-648).
5. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
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VICARIOUS CIVIL LIABILITY
the scope of his agency. The issue is of intense practical concern to
the bar because a workable theory of vicarious liability is often the
only way to find a pecuniary defendant to join in the lawsuit. Con-
versely, with RICO, it exposes corporations and other businesses to
treble damages for acts which may have been committed by low-
level employees. Thus, the stakes in this debate are enormous for
everyone. In the context of the civil RICO provisions, the debate is
further complicated by the fact that the Act functions to impose
civil liability for criminal acts. The rules governing the imputation
of criminal responsibility from one person to another or from a nat-
ural person to a corporation are substantially different from those
governing civil responsibility. There is a tendency to confuse the
two issues in the context of a statute which imposes civil liability for
criminal acts. This Article will analyze the current case law bearing
on the question whether RICO contemplates vicarious civil liability,
in light of the structure of the statute, its legislative history, and
analogous case law, particularly that under the antitrust laws.
I. BASES FOR IMPOSING DERIVATIVE LIABILITY
For reasons related almost solely to the structure of the statute,
RICO plaintiffs have relied primarily on subsections (c) and (d) of
section 1962 in bringing claims for commercial or business fraud.
Subsection (c) makes it "unlawful for any person employed by or
associated with any enterprise . . . to conduct or participate di-
rectly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . ." Subsection (d)
makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the substantive pro-
visions: (a), (b) or (c). 6 Plaintiffs are beginning to experiment more
with subsections (a) and (b) particularly when they want to charge a
corporation directly with violations of the Act. But while those
subsections speak in terms of control of an enterprise, subsection (c)
speaks only of participation in the affairs of the enterprise. Because
it is so much broader, subsection (c) is more frequently used by
RICO plaintiffs.
Broadly speaking, the statute imposes liability on any "person,"
who acquires, controls, or conducts the business of an "enterprise"
through a pattern of racketeering activity. It does not impose liabil-
ity on the enterprise in express terms. A "person" is defined in sec-
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982), subsection (a) by its language is designed to prevent
the takeover or operation of legitimate business by anyone using funds derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity. It has been used sparingly by civil litigants. Subsection
(b) prohibits the takeover of any enterprise through acts constituting a pattern of racke-
teering activity. It has been used somewhat more frequently, particularly in tender offer
cases. See, e.g., Spencer Cos. v. Agency-Rent-A-Car [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. 1981).
1985]
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tion 1961 to include any individual or "entity" capable of holding
an interest in property. Clearly, a corporation, partnership, or trust
can be an offending person within the terms of the statute, but only
when it controls or participates in the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. Moreover, an enterprise
may be any individual, legal entity, in effect, a partnership or corpo-
ration or association in fact. 7
The courts have struggled with the theoretical bases for imposing
vicarious or derivative liability in civil RICO cases. There are, per-
haps, three distinct approaches to this issue: 1) some courts have
held that the statute reaches cases where there is an identity be-
tween the "person" and the "enterprise" required by subsection (c),
so that a corporation may be charged directly with conducting its
own affairs in violation of the statute; 2) others have held that the
statute does not abrogate the broadest basis of vicarious liability in
civil cases; respondeat superior liability, thus exposing corporations
to liability for the offending acts of their agents and employees; and
3) still others have held that an agent and his principal constitute
the necessary plurality of actors for imposing liability under title 18
section 1962(d). These approaches are quite different and their ap-
plications depend on the facts and the pleading context in which the
case is decided. The third approach-imposing liability based upon
co-conspirator status-has certain analytical limitations. Under
traditional notions of conspiracy law, all co-conspirators must have
a culpable mens rea and all must share the specific intent to commit
the substantive crime.8 It is no less true with section 1962(d). 9
Although the law will impute acts and statements from one co-con-
spirator to another, liability is not vicarious; i.e., derived solely from
the liability of another, but is personal to those who share conspira-
torial intent. Thus, it would seem that any person who has civil
liability under section 1962(d) will also have personal, as opposed to
vicarious liability, under subsections (a), (b) or (c), if the acts consti-
tuting the violation are completed.10 The real question is whether
and under what circumstances can a civil plaintiff reach a corporate
purse in true derivative fashion under the Act. A workable theory
of vicarious corporate liability, when coupled with the treble dam-
7. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 582 (1981).
8. United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975).
9. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279,
332 (D.N.J. 1984) (finding a requirement that RICO specific intent be present).
10. Moreover, the entire issue of intra-enterprise conspiracy has been clouded by
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
52 U.S.L.W. 482 In (1984), which held that parent and subsidiary corporations together
do not constitute a plurality of actors for puposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act which
requires "concerted" action in violation of the antitrust laws.
[Vol. 21
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age provision of section 1964, will undoubtedly have a substantial
effect on the future course of RICO litigation.
II. THE HARTLEY AND COMPUTER SCIENCES CASES: THE
PERSON/ENTERPRISE DEBATE
Obviously, one way to establish corporate liability is to allege that
the "person" and the "enterprise" are one, i.e., that the enterprise,
usually the deep pocket, has conducted its own affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity. Since the literal language of section
1962 imposes liability only on the "person" who controls or con-
ducts an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, some
lawyers have thought it necessary to equate the "person" and the
"enterprise" so as to establish enterprise liability. For example, in a
typical securities fraud case, the plaintiff may allege that the broker-
age house has conducted its own affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. At least on its face, this avoids vicarious liability
issues by charging the enterprise directly with violations of the Act.
This pleading technique is somewhat misleading because whenever
a corporation is sued there still arise significant questions concern-
ing those acts which may be attributed to the corporation. More-
over, the courts have differed on whether the person and the
enterprise may be one and the same. Certainly, the definitions of
person and enterprise in section 1961 are broad enough to support
such a theory.
In United States v. Hartley,1" the Eleventh Circuit held that a
single corporation can be both the person and the enterprise under
section 1962(c). Hartley relied upon the broad reading of "enter-
prise" announced in United States v. Turkette, 12 (Turkette), the lib-
eral construction proviso in the original legislation,' 3 and the fact
that the literal terms of section 1962(c) do not exclude identity be-
tween person.and enterprise, in holding that a corporation can be
charged directly under that section. 14
To the same effect, Judge Ackermann in his lengthy opinion in
United States v. Local 560, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters"5 con-
cluded that it is possible for a single defendant to constitute both the
person and the enterprise contemplated by subsection 1962(c). He
also said, however, that resolution of the issue "depend(s) on the
circumstances of each case." Using these two cases, a plaintiff can
charge a corporation directly with violations of the Act arising out
11. 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170, 1183 (1983).
12. 452 U.S. 582 (1981).
13. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
14. Hartley, 678 F.2d at 988.
15. 581 F. Supp. 279,329 (D.N.J. 1984).
1985]
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of the conduct of the corporation's business in an effort to avoid
raising vicarious liability questions at the pleading stage. The rule
in Hartley, however, has practically no following. 16
The leading case to the contrary is the Fourth Circuit decision in
United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.,'1 (Computer Sciences). In
this case a corporation and several of its officers and employees
were indicted for deliberately overbilling the federal government for
computer programming and processing services. In one count of
the indictment the government alleged that the corporation, Com-
puter Sciences, Inc., had conducted the affairs of its corporate divi-
sion, Infonet, through a pattern of racketeering activity. The court
of appeals, in reviewing a district court order dismissing the entire
indictment, held that section 1962 does not comtemplate that the
person and the enterprise, however characterized, can be identical.
[The question is] whether Congress ever intended, in 18 U.S.C.
section 1962 that the statute prohibit activities by a person where
the activities are described as occurring with any enterprise when
there was identity between the person, on the one hand, and the
entity, on the other. We conclude that enterprise was meant to
refer to a being different from, not the same as or part of, the
person whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit.18
The court went on to say that since the Infonet division had no
identity apart from the corporation itself, an allegation that the cor-
poration, Computer Sciences, Inc., conducted the affairs of Infonet
through a pattern of racketeering activity did not charge a crime
under the statute. The court recognized that a corporate division
may constitute an "enterprise" although not a "person" within the
terms of the statute, and also that a corporation may constitute a
"person," but concluded that there must be separate identities to
make a case under the language of section 1962.19 This holding
precludes a complaint in which the person and the enterprise do not
have separate identities. To use the securities case example, the
pleader could not charge the brokerage house with conducting its
16. Accord, United Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Corp., No. 83 C 5408,
slip op. (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 1984); United States v. Local 560, International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984); Mooney v. Fidelity Union Bank, No. 82-
3192, slip op. (D.N.J. March 11, 1983); D'Iorio v. Andonzio, 554 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.
Pa. 1982); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Chemical Bank, No. 82-1714, slip op. (D.N.J. Oct. 27,
1982). See also Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Ben-
nett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 324 n.181 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Civil
Fraud in Context] ("Hartley is a thoughtful well reasoned opinion .... ").
17. 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
18. Id. at 1190.
19. The courts explicit statement that the enterprise cannot be "part of" the per-
son, or the implicit suggestion that the person cannot be part of the enterprise is proba-
bly wrong, even if the statute requires distinction of identities. Computer Sciences, 689
F.2d at 1190.
[Vol. 21
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own affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity since such a
pleading would not set up separate identities for the person and the
enterprise. Computer Sciences has been followed in a majority of
the cases decided since then.20
The Seventh Circuit decision in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co.,21 (Haroco), neatly posed and answered the per-
son/enterprise question with the following language:
We do not doubt that a corporation may satisfy the section
1961 definitions of both "person" and "enterprise", as the court
observed in Hartley. But we focus our attention on the language
in section 1962(c) requiring that the liable person be "employed
by or associated with any enterprise" which affects interstate or
foreign commerce. The use of the terms "employed by" and "as-
sociated with" appears to contemplate a person distinct from the
enterprise. If Congress had meant to permit the same entity to
be the liable person and the enterprise under section 1962(c), it
would have required only a simple change in language to make
that intention crystal clear.22
Professor G. Robert Blakey, a recognized authority on RICO,
clearly sides with the Hartley court.23 He contends that the Com-
puter Sciences opinion ignores the liberal construction clause at-
tached to the Act, and ignores the basic policy decisions inherent in
the Act. The Haroco panel, for one, recognized, however, that the
broad policy considerations of RICO and the liberal construction
clause are at odds to some degree with the language of section
1962(c) on this issue. As the court put it: "we do not think the
general principle of liberal interpretation of RICO can be used to
stretch section 1962(c) to reach this situation in the face of the sub-
section's own limits."'24
20. Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Berg, 685
F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part on rehearing en banc, 710 F.2d 1361, cert.
denied sub. nom., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Saine v. AIA,
Inc., 582 F. Supp. 1299 (D.C. 1984); Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co.,
577 F. Supp. 1415 (D. Or. 1984); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F.
Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983); In Re Action Industries Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846
(E.D. Va. 1983); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa 1983);
Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Van Schaik v.
Church of Scientology of California, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass 1982); Field's v.
National Republic Bank of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ill. 1982); and Bays v.
Hunter Say. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
Most recently the Third Circuit has joined the majority view in B.F. Hirsch v. En-
right Ref. Co., Inc., No. 84-5087 slip op. (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 1984). The court held that
section 1962(c) requires that the defendant corporation and the RICO enterprise be
distinct entities.
21. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984).
22. Id. at 400.
23. See, Civil Fraud in Context, supra note 16, at 324 n.181; See also Sedima, 741
F.2d 482, 486, 486 n.6 (2d Cir. 1984).
24. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 482, 400 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1985).
1985]
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 21 [1984], No. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol21/iss2/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Although the court concluded that the language of section
1962(c) does not contemplate an identity of "person" and "enter-
prise," the Haroco panel concluded, nonetheless, that section
1962(a) does contemplate such an identity. The court stated:
[A] corporation-enterprise may be held liable under subsection
(a) when the corporation is also a perpetrator. As we parse sub-
section (a), a "person" (such as a corporation-enterprise) acts
unlawfully if it receives income derived directly or indirectly
from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has
participated as a principal within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2,
and if the person uses the income in the establishment or opera-
tion of an enterprise affecting commerce. Subsection (a) does not
contain any of the language in subsection (c) which suggests that
the liable person and the enterprise must be separate. Under sub-
section (a), therefore, the liable person may be a corporation us-
ing the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its
operations. 25
The Haroco reasoning reduces the person/enterprise debate,
which usually arises in the context of allegations under section
1962(c) to an academic question. In many cases, it is not difficult to
plead that a corporation has recieved some income from the racke-
teering activity of its agent or employee and that it has used that
income in the operation of its business. It may be much more diffi-
cult, however, to prove that the receipt of income is the result of
racketeering activity in which the corporation participated directly.
In any event, both subsections (a) and (c) are rife with agency ques-
tions when the issue is whether the corporation has participated as a
principal in the racketeering activity.26
In the final analysis, the person/enterprise debate, begs the real
question which is whether RICO contemplates derivative liability at
all. In the person/enterprise cases there must be at least an allega-
tion that the corporation has itself conducted the affairs of an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Since a corporation
can act only through natural persons, there remains the issue of
when and under what circumstances the law should impute racke-
teering acts to a corporation. That question is really nothing more
or less than the broader question of when to impose criminal liabil-
25. Id. at 402 (emphasis added by the court).
26. Since only a handful of civil RICO cases have gone to trial, the person/enter-
prise question has usually been addressed in the context of the pleadings. One way
around the Computer Sciences decision, which leaves the corporation exposed to liabil-
ity is to allege that the corporation qua "person" is conducting the affairs of a different
"enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activity. Usually the "enterprise" is de-
fined as an association-in-fact consisting of the corporation and its agents or employees
who have committed the racketeering acts.
[Vol. 21
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ity on a corporation for the acts of its agents or employees. 27
Civil RICO actions require proof of criminal conduct.2 8 That is,
an allegation that a corporation has conducted its affairs or the af-
fairs of some other enterprise through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity still requires proof that the corporation "committed" the
predicate racketeering acts. Corporate criminal liability is based
upon imputing the acts and intent of corporate agents to the entity
itself. In general, a corporation is criminally liable for the acts of an
agent, or employee, when those acts are done within the scope of
the agent's authority, in the course of the agency, and when they
have a purpose to benefit the corporation.2 9 For the most part, it is
immaterial whether the corporation actually benefits from the act.
30
But in every case the pertinent inquiry is whether the general policy
considerations of law enforcement, and the specific policy consider-
ations of the criminal statute in issue, are such that the acts of the
agent should be imputed to the corporation. This analysis is not
unlike that which is used in deciding whether to impose civil liabil-
ity on a principal for the acts of his agent-so called respondeat
superior liability.3 1 The best course for plaintiffs is to reach the cor-
poration through its relationship with the agent who has engaged in
racketeering activity. Common law rules of agency are enough to
expose a corporation to RICO liability when a corporate agent has
violated the statute while acting within the scope of his agency. But
even this rule, which follows directly from common law principles,
is subject to dispute in the RICO context.
III. TRUE RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY
Only a handful of decisions have addressed directly the question
of respondeat superior liability under the Act. The question has
also recieved some attention in legal commentary.
32
In one of the first such decisions, Parnes v. Heinhold Commodi-
27. See, Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Obser-
vation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 393, 415 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brickey].
28. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501 ("RICO liability simply does not exist without crimi-
nal conduct .... ). Haroco, 747 F.2d at 404 ("RICO liability must be based, after all,
on findings of criminal conduct").
The "burden of proof' issue-whether to require Civil RICO plaintiffs to prove a
case beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence-is a separate
matter. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) and Haroco, 747
F.2d at 404.
29. See United States v. Demairo, 581 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Carter 311 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1963); and United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. at 337.
30. See Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945); United
States v. Gibson Products Co., 426 F. Supp. 768 (D.Tex. 1976).
31. See Brickey, supra note 27, at 415-16.
32. See Civil Fraud in Context, supra note 16, at 286-325.
1985]
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ties, Inc.,as (Parnes), Judge Shadur of the Nothern District of Illi-
nois, concluded that the normal rules of civil liability do not
necessarily apply in cases brought under RICO. Parnes is interest-
ing, at least in part, because it presents a "routine" securities case in
which the plaintiffs alleged that they had been damaged, by fraudu-
lent trading practices of two of the defendants employee/brokers.
The plaintiffs sued the brokerage house under section 1962, alleging
that Heinhold Commodities, Inc., was equally responsible with the
errant brokers for the damages suffered by the plaintiff. The court
first noted that a "normal reading" of section 1962(c) made the
plaintiffs pleading task difficult.
Under the allegations of the Complaint the normal reading of
the RICO sections would characterize brokers Keever and Cos-
tello, the two active wrongdoers, as the "persons" engaged in the
conduct of Heinhold's affairs through the brokers' "pattern of
racketeering activity." Heinhold would normally be viewed as
the "enterprise" by whom the "persons" were employed. That
normal reading however gives plaintiffs no comfort, for they
have sued not the alleged RICO violators-"persons" Keever
and Costello- but "enterprise" Heinhold. Plaintiffs have not
brought themselves within RICO's coverage under the normal
application of the statutory definitions and terms.34
Judge Shadur considered the possibility of viewing the defendant
corporation as a "person" while viewing the two brokers as the "en-
terprise. 35 He concluded that such a possibility would "turn the
English language on its head."' 36 The judge went on to say that
even if he viewed the corporation as the section 1962(c) "person" it
was still necessary to impute to it the criminal acts of the two bro-
kers/employees. He rejected that interpretation of the statute,
saying,
that sort of respondeat superior application, perhaps permissible
to establish ordinary civil liability, would be bizarre indeed as a
means to warp the facts alleged in this case into the RICO mold.
Under that theory malefactors at a low corporate level could
thrust treble damage liability on a wholly unwitting corporate
management and shareholders.37
The opinion recognizes that even if section 1962 permits the corpo-
ration to stand as a person, whether or not different from the enter-
33. 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
34. Id. at 24.
35. He did not suggest viewing the two brokers and the corporation as an associa-
tion-in-fact thus establishing the enterprise requirement.
36. Parties, 548 F. Supp. at 24.
37. Id. at 24 n.9. Presumably, Judge Shadur would have found corporate liability
under the appropriate securities laws which do incorporate "ordinary civil liability"
rules. Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 21
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prise, RICO, by itself, does not answer the question when to impute
racketeering acts of an agent or employee to the corporation.
The next significant RICO opinion dealing with respondeat supe-
rior liability is Dakis v. Chapman, (Dakis).38 Again, the case arose
in a somewhat routine securities context: the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's broker/employee had "churned" her late husband's
brokerage account over a long period of time causing substantial
losses which were undiscovered until after her husbands death. The
court assumed that the complaint made out multiple violations of
federal securities laws. The court concluded, however, that the
complaint failed to state a RICO claim against the defendant bro-
kerage houses because it did not "allege more than respondeat supe-
rior liability on either firms' part in any security violation commited
by [the offending broker]."' 39 The Dakis court stated it as follows:
RICO draws a significant distinction between the aggressor
enterprise, legitimate or illegitimate . . . and the infiltrated or
injured enterprise. Here, the firms can only be characterized as
"conduits" through which [the offending brokher] conducted his
churning-themselves victims of an ongoing rule infraction by
an employee. Although, it isn't necessary that the aggressor en-
terprise be formally distinct from the "responsible person(s)"(§ 1962(c)), it is necessary that whomever is to be held liable
under RICO has him(it)self been actively engaged in the pattern
of racketeering.40
The court did recognize that the brokerage firms would be re-
sponsible under a theory of respondeat superior liability for viola-
tions of the securities laws committed by corporate agents or
employees, but it was unwilling to extend such liability to claims
brought under RICO.41
The third important case in this series is Bernstein v. IDT Corpo-
ration.42 There, the plaintiff, who was the trustee in bankruptcy of
Frigitemp, Inc., sued General Dynamics Corp. and various individ-
ual defendants for looting Frigitemp by demanding kickbacks and
illegal rebates in exchange for subcontract work at General Dynam-
ics' Quincy Shipyard. The complaint alleged that the culpable acts
of bribery and extortion were committed by senior officers of Gen-
eral Dynamics in the course of their employment, thus exposing
38. 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
39. Id. at 759.
40. Id. at 760 (citations omitted).
41. Id. The court went so far as to suggest that the brokerage firms had viable
RICO claims against their faithless employee. On the facts of Dakis that may have been
true, but it doesn't have much to do with the question whether the corporation should
be liable to innocent third parties who have been defrauded by a corporate employee
acting in the scope of his authority.
42. 582 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Del. 1984).
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General Dynamics to vicarious liability for the resulting damage.
The RICO count, fashioned under section 1962(c), specifically al-
leged that General Dynamics and two of its corporate officers "con-
ducted the affairs of General Dynamics through a pattern of
racketeering activity. ' '43 The plaintiff, apparently relying on Hart-
ley, set about squarely to prove that General Dynamics through its
corporate officers had conducted its own affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity.
Judge Stapleton recast the issue significantly. After alluding to
the split between Hartley and Computer Sciences, he made the point
that the relevant considerations are different in the context of a civil
lawsuit. He reasoned that since Hartley and Computer Sciences
were criminal cases it was necessary to decide whether an enterprise
may be charged as a "person" under section 1962, and if so whether
that section contemplates an identity between the person charged
and the enterprise. That is so because the law generally does not
recognize vicarious criminal liability, although a corporation may
be criminally liable through the acts of its agents done within the
scope of their authority for the benefit of the corporation.
44
The issue in Bernstein, on the other hand, was General Dynam-
ics' civil liability for RICO violations committed by two of its of-
ficers. The court concluded that General Dynamics could be held
liable civilly under the circumstances.
When conduct is proscribed by a federal statute and civil lia-
bility for that conduct is explicitly or implicitly imposed, the nor-
mal rules of agency law apply in the absence of some indication
that Congress had a contrary intent ...
The trustee here alleges that the corporate officers committed
a statutory tort by conducting the affairs of General Dynamics
through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation RICO.
That activity included extortion of kickbacks and misrepresenta-
tion in a bankruptcy proceeding. I perceive nothing in RICO or
its legislative history which would suggest that the normal rule of
agency not apply to the civil liability created by that statute. To
the contrary . . . it appears to me that application of the doc-
trines of apparent authority and respondeat superior will, at
least, in most instances further the statutory goals.45
Shortly after Bernstein was decided, Judge Hardy of the district
court of Arizona decided O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,46
(O'Brien), which followed Dakis and Parnes. O'Brien was yet an-
other "churning" case brought under both the federal securities
laws and the civil RICO provisions. The plaintiff attempted to
43. Bernstein, 582 F. Supp. at 1082.
44. See Brickey, supra note 27, at 415.
45. Id. at 1083-84 (citations omitted).
46. 1 RICO Litig. Rptr. 153 (D. Ariz. 1984).
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reach Dean, Witter through an allegation that the company had
failed to supervise adequately the activities of its broker. The court
concluded that negligence alone will never suffice to establish liabil-
ity under section 1962.47 But the court went on to note that even if
the plaintiff sought to reach Dean, Witter solely through the acts of
its authorized agent, the complaint under RICO would be deficient.
Judge Hardy apparently thought that the determinative question
was whether Dean, Witter had "knowledge" of the fact that its bro-
ker had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. He held
squarely that "the knowledge of a defendant may not be imputed to
another by the doctrine of respondeat superior."' 48 He gave the
plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint alleging that Dean,
Witter "knowingly or intentionally participated in [the broker's]
racketeering activities."' 49 The opinion leaves unanswered what
kind of evidence would support a finding that the brokerage firm
had intentionally participated in such activities. The opinion also
misconstrues the doctrine of respondeat superior, although in all
fairness, it seems that the complaint was vague at best.50 The doc-
trine of respondeat superior does not impute knowledge or intent
but rather holds the principal strictly liable for the acts of his agent
done within the scope of the agency. 51
Of the few civil RICO cases discussing respondeat superior liabil-
ity, only Bernstein placed any substantial reliance on RICO's closest
analog-the antitrust laws.52 In concluding that General Dynamics
could be held liable under the civil RICO provisions, the Bernstein
opinion placed appropriated reliance on the recent Supreme Court
decision in American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel,
Corp.,53 (Hydrolevel). Hydrolevel was a suit under section 4 of the
Clayton Act for damages arising out of alleged violations of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.5 4 Hydrolevel Corp. brought suit
against the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (Society or
ASME), a nonprofit trade association which among other things
47. Id. at 157.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The Eleventh Circuit opinion in Hartley makes a passing reference to the issue
of respondeat superior liability under the Act. In a footnote the court said, "[s]ince a
corporation is liable for the acts of its agents and employees, it permits an employee's
activities to serve as proof of the two predicate acts required by section 1962(c). This is
simply a reality to be faced by corporate entities. With the advantages of incorporation
must come the appendant responsibilities." Hartley, 678 F.2d at 988-89 n.43. Hartley,
of course, was a criminal case which raised slightly different issues.
51. See PROSSER, supra note 5, § 69.
52. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO). Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TENiP. L.Q. 1009 (1980).
53. 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
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promulgates professional engineering standards. Hydrolevel sued
ASME when it discovered that one of its competitors had improp-
erly participated through an ASME subcommittee in promulgating
certain design standards which adversely affected Hydrolevel's
competitive position. In promulgating the safety standard at issue,
the Society acted solely through two members of its Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Committee who were full-time employees of a com-
pany in direct competition with Hydrolevel. The effect of the safety
standard was to prefer the competitor's design for the emergency
fuel cutoff over Hydrolevel's. Since the standards had significant
influence in the industry, Hydrolevel's business was ruined after the
fuel cutoff standard was issued. The question before the court was
"the Society's civil liability under the antitrust law for acts of its
agents performed with apparent authority. '55
The Supreme Court canvassed the federal cases dealing with the
civil liability of a principal for the acts of an agent in a number of
statutory and common law contexts. The Court noted that "[i]n a
wide variety of areas, the federal courts. . . have imposed liability
upon principals for the misdeeds of agents acting with apparent au-
thority."' 56 Liability, the Court said, "is based upon the fact that
the agent's position facilitates the consummation of the fraud, in
that, from the point of view of the third person, the transaction
seems regular on its face and the agent appears to be acting in the
ordinary course of the business confided to him." 57 Thus, the
Court concluded that the fundamental question was whether the
well-recognized rule that a principal is responsible for the acts of his
agents done within the scope of the agent's authority was "consis-
tent with the intent of the antitrust laws." 58 The Justices, with rea-
soning that is strikingly apt in the context of civil RICO, held
squarely that the antitrust laws, including their treble damage pro-
visions, contemplate that a principal shall be liable for the acts of
his agent done with apparent authority. The Court based its hold-
ing on three broad grounds.
First, the Court found that the threat of vicarious civil liability
will have an appropriate deterrent effect in the industry.
It is true that imposing liability on ASME's agents themselves
will have some deterrent effect, because they will know that if
they violate the antitrust laws through their participation in
ASME, they risk the consequences of personal civil liability. But
55. American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
558-59 (1982).
56. Id. at 568.
57. Id. at 566 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261, at 571
(1957)).
58. Id. at 570.
[Vol. 21
13
Dwyer, and Kiely: Vicarious Civil Liability Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corr
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
VICARIOUS CIVIL LIABILITY
if, in addition, ASME is civilly liable for the antitrust violations
of its agents acting with apparent authority, it is much more
likely that similar antitrust violations will not occur in the future.
"[P]ressure [will be] brought on [the organization] to see to it
that [its] agents abide by the law." Only ASME can take system-
atic steps to make improper conduct on the part of all its agents
unlikely, and the possibility of civil liability will inevitably be a
powerful incentive for ASME to take those steps.5 9
Second, the Court concluded that vicarious civil liability under
the antitrust laws is not limited to situations in which the agent acts
to benefit his principal. The court held that a rule limiting corpo-
rate vicarious liability to cases where the agent acts to benefit the
corporation is "irrelevant to the purposes of the antitrust laws."
Whether they intend to benefit ASME or not, ASME's agents
exercise economic power because they act with the force of the
Society's reputation behind them. And, whether they act in part
to benefit ASME or solely to benefit themselves or their employ-
ers, ASME's agents can have the same anticompetitive effects on
the marketplace. The anticompetitive practices of ASMES's
agents are repugnant to the antitrust laws even if the agents act
without any intent to aid ASME, and ASME should be en-
couraged to eliminate the anticompetitive practices of all its
agents acting with apparent authority, especially those who use
their positions in ASME solely for their own benefit ... .60
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court concluded that
it is not inappropriate under the antitrust laws to impose treble
damage liability on a principal for the acts of his agent done with
apparent authority.
Treble damages "make the remedy meaningful by counterbal-
ancing 'the difficulty of maintaining a private suit'" under the
antitrust laws. Since treble damages serve as a means of deter-
ring anti-trust violations and of compensating victims, it is in ac-
cord with both the purposes of the antitrust laws and principles
of agency law to hold ASME liable for the acts of agents commit-
ted with apparent authority.6 1
As the opinion duly notes, even the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, which limits a principal's vicarious liability for punitive
damages, takes the position that a principal may be liable vicari-
ously for punitive damages when that liability is based upon a stat-
ute which has its own enhanced damages provision.
62
59. Id. at 572.
60. Id. at 574.
61. Id. at 575-76 (citations omitted). The Hydrolevel opinion also notes that such a
limitation on the principal's liability for punitive damages may be misplaced when the
principal is a corporation which can act only through an agent. Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at
575 n.14.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C, Comment c at 474 (1958).
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For the most part, the policy arguments for vicarious antitrust
liability advanced by the majority in Hydrolevel can be made with
equal force under the civil RICO provisions. Moreover, the statu-
tory arguments for vicarious antitrust liability all have an analog
under RICO.63 At the policy level, it is clear that the legislative
history of both the antitrust laws and RICO evince a congressional
intent that the statutes be liberally construed to effectuate their
broad remedial purposes.64 The vicarious liability of a corporation
for the acts of its agents and employees is well established at com-
mon law, even where those acts are ultra vires of the corporation.65
To the extent that vicarious liability functions to influence corpora-
tions to supervise their employees, it can be argued that there is
little reason to distinguish between the antitrust laws and RICO;
the need to provide inducements to corporate responsibility is as
great with respect to RICO violations as with antitrust violations.
From an economic standpoint, the corporation is best able to spread
the risk of damage from racketeering activity by corporate agents.
Finally, if the treble damage provisions of the antitrust laws and
RICO are understood primarily as an incentive to private litigants
rather than as punitive damages, then there is no obvious conflict
between enhanced damages and vicarious liability. If anything, en-
hanced damages provide an effective incentive only when coupled
with vicarious liability because vicarious liability is usually the only
way to expose a "deep pocket. ' '66
63. A relatively minor factor in the Hydrolevel decision, but one which applies with
equal force in RICO cases, is the fact that the definition of a "person" who may be
liable under the antitrust laws includes "corporations and associations." Hydrolevel,
456 U.S. at 573 n.ll. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) defines a person who may be liable under
RICO to include "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial inter-
est in property." An entity, like a corporation, can only act through natural persons;
since RICO contemplates "entity" liability just as the antitrust laws contemplate "cor-
porate" liability, the statutes necessarily contemplate some vicarious liability.
64. See Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 573 n.11.
65. In the early case of State v. Morriss & Essex & R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852), the
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the argument that a corporation cannot commit a
criminal act because its charter does not confer the power to do so. The court said:
According to the doctrine contended for, if they do an act within the scope of
their corporate powers it is legal, and they are not answerable for the conse-
quences. If the act be not within the range of their corporate powers, they had
no right be law to do it, it was not one of the objects for which they were
incorporated, and therefore is no act of the corporation at all. This doctrine
leads to absolute impunity for every species of wrong, and can never be sanc-
tioned by any court of justice.
Id. at 369.
66. At the statutory level, it has already been noted that both the antitrust laws and
RICO define a "person who may be liable very broadly to include corporations and
other collective entities. Moreover, the particular language which Congress used in cre-
ating the private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 is modeled closely on the lan-
guage of section 4 of the Clayton Act. See Bankers Trust, 741 F. 2d at 517. There is,
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IV. A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
Professor Blakey has written that it is appropriate first to charac-
terize the role of the corporation with regard to the pattern of rack-
eteering activity before deciding whether to impose civil RICO
liability on the corporation.67 In general, he favors imposing such
liability when the corporation is a "perpetrator," or when it acts as
an "instrument or conduit" for the offending activity.68 He opposes
civil liability when the corporation is itself the victim of racketeer-
ing.69 However, it is not always easy to determine exactly what role
the corporation plays. More troublesome is the fact that in many
racketeering schemes orchestrated by corporate agents, the corpora-
tion may have characteristics of a "perpetrator," an "instrument"
or "conduit," and a "victim." The corporation's role may change
over time. Within Professor Blakey's framework, it is difficult, for
example, to characterize the corporation's role in a typical securities
churning case. The brokerage house, which has done nothing more
than employ the offending broker, may actually realize a short term
benefit from the broker's illegal activities. But, in all probability, it
will also suffer a long-term loss from such activity, particularly if
the activity is uncovered and prosecuted vigorously. It is clear
under federal securities law that a brokerage house can be held lia-
ble for the fraudulent activities of an errant broker/employee in the
usual case.70 It is difficult to see why the result should be different
under RICO for securities law violations which also make out a
case under RICO. Yet, in Dakis, which involved broker-level secur-
ities law violations, the district judge concluded that the brokerage
house "suffered direct economic harm" from the activities of its
faithless employee; thus, it was inappropriate to impose viacarious
liability on the brokerage house.71 Dakis is consistent with Profes-
sor Blakey's analysis if the brokerage house was a true victim of the
broker's fraudulent activity. That question, however, would spark
debate. As a matter of fact, one does not have to go beyond Profes-
sor Blakey's writing to see the debate. He makes the point that in
Parnes, the court "grasped the correct principle" but, alas, "incor-
rectly applied it.''72 Parnes involved unadorned securities fraud not
unlike the pattern in Dakis. The plaintiff sought to reach the bro-
kerage house based on a theory of respondeat superior. Judge
finally, a clear congressional mandate as to each that the law be liberally construed to
effectuate its purpose. See id. at 521 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
67. See Civil Fraud in Context, supra note 16, at 307-25.
68. Id. at 323-24.
69. Id. at 323.
70. Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
71. Dakis, 574 F. Supp. at 760.
72. See, Civil Fraud in Context, supra note 16, at 323 n.179.
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Shadur, wrestling with the treble damage provision and the statu-
tory label "racketeer," concluded that it would be inequitable to
hold the brokerage house liable where it was victimized by its own
"low-level" employee. But Professor Blakey disagrees that, on the
facts of Parnes, the brokerage house was a victim. For him "the
facts alleged make the [brokerage house] not a victim, but a perpe-
trator, which hardly casts [it] in a sympathetic role."' 73 The analysis
is inherently difficult to apply because there is often dispute over
the true role of the corporation. A rule which yields such divergent
results on one set of facts is of almost no help to plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike.
Moreover, Professor Blakey concedes that even within his analyt-
ical framework, the most difficult cases are those in which the cor-
poration functions as an instrument or conduit for the racketeering
activity.
A more difficult issue, however, is presented by the role of "in-
strument." The enterprise is used in the unlawful conduct, but it
is not its author in the same sense as it is when the enterprise is
the "perpetrator." Nonetheless, it is not wholly innocent, as
when it plays the role of purely a "prize" or "victim." The cru-
cial issue comes down to determining the general impact of vica-
rious or entity liability in controlling the unlawful conduct.
Should the risks of loss be shifted for civil liability? Would a
broadening of the onus of criminal responsibility tend to alter the
conduct of other individuals or those who are in charge of the
entity, so that the unlawful conduct itself would be curtailed?
On balance, the remedial purposes of RICO tip judgment toward
finding civil liability, but not criminal responsibility for the en-
terprise when its role is purely that of "instrument."' 74
Unfortunately, Professor Blakey offers little guidance on the dif-
ference between a perpetrator, an instrument, and a victim. The
conceptual problems in characterizing corporate behavior may be
almost insurmountable in some cases, like, for example, stockholder
derivative suits carrying RICO allegations.
The Seventh Circuit in Haroco adapted Professor Blakey's policy
analysis to a statutory-construction analysis to achieve the same re-
sult. The Haroco court reasoned that since section 1962(c) contem-
plates separate identities for person and enterprise, there can be no
direct "enterprise liability" under that section. The Court went on
to say, however, that inasmuch as subsection (a) contemplates an
identity between person and enterprise, a corporation (enterprise)
may be liable under that subsection "if it receives income derived
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in
73. Id.
74. Id. at 323-24 (footnote omitted).
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which [it] has participated as a principal within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 2, and if [it] uses the income in the establishment or opera-
tion of an enterprise affecting commerce. ' 75 The Haroco decision
apparently would limit corporate civil liability to those cases in
which the corporation has participated in the racketeering activity
at least as an "aider and abettor," under traditional tests of corpo-
rate criminal responsibility. 76 This approximates Professor Blakey's
catagory of cases in which the corporation is a "perpetrator." It
probably excludes, however, a great number of cases in which Pro-
fessor Blakey would characterize the corporation as an instrument
or conduit-for him a nexus sufficient for imposing civil liability.77
Moreover, the rule in Haroco requires some degree of corporate
participation sufficient at least to make the corporation an acces-
sory under 18 U.S.C. section 2. In that respect it is at odds with
Hydrolevel and more traditional jurisprudential tests for vicarious
civil liability.7 8 In Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman,79 another
judge in the Seventh Circuit made the point that "[a]nyone who
would be guilty in a criminal proceeding of aiding and abetting a
fraud would be liable under tort law as a participant in the fraud
since aider and abettor liability requires participation in the crimi-
nal venture." 80 That Congress could have intended such a substan-
tial change in civil liability tests without a clear expression in the
statute is doubtful at best. The legislative history of the Act is also
silent on this point.
75. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 402 (emphasis added by the court).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1948) provides as follows:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
as a principal.
Liability as an aider and abetter is established when the evidence shows that the de-
fendant associated himself with the venture, that he wished to bring it about, and that
he sought by his actions to make it succeed. United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 531
(1 lth Cir. 1982).
77. Although, on balance, Professor Blakey would impose civil liability on a "con-
duit" corporation, he would not impose criminal liability. Civil Fraud in Context, supra
note 16, at 324. Haroco makes the cogent point that there are "no statutory grounds for
such a distinction between civil and criminal liability." Haroco, 747 F.2d at 404.
78. Haroco also cites with approval the statement in United States v. Hartley that a
corporation is generally liable for the acts of its agents and employees. Haroco, 747
F.2d at 401 n.18. But Haroco does not cite the Supreme Court decision in Hydrolevel
which has obvious application to RICO cases raising vicarious liability issues. And, as
noted above, the rule suggested by Haroco in dictum is probably a good deal more
narrow that the broad rule in Hydrolevel.
79. 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982).
80. Id. at 453.
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V. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Among those courts which have refused to impose vicarious cor-
porate liability in civil RICO cases, the chief concern expressed is
whether it is appropriate to impose a treble damage remedy on a
corporation which may not have benefited from the racketeering
activity, and whose liability is wholly derivative.81 To a lesser ex-
tent, the courts have been concerned with the label "racketeering
activity" when it is applied to activity which is not characteristic of
organized crime and which has no connection to organized crime.82
From an economic standpoint, the issue is whether enhanced
damages (more than simple damages) can be imposed on a party
whose liability is derivative, without causing substantial disecono-
mies. The issue can be broken down into its component parts: de-
rivative or vicarious liability and enhanced damages.83
A. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability is, from the viewpoint of the defendant, strict
liability because it is imposed without respect to the defendant's
fault. Modern theories of damages justify strict liability on several
bases. First, it provides a greater incentive for those exposed to
such liability to take cost-effective precautions to avoid the liability.
Cost-effective precautions are those which cost less than the overall
cost of whatever damage or loss the precaution is designed to pre-
vent. In general, the overall cost of an accident is a function of the
actual damages which will result and the probability that the acci-
dent will occur. Economists theorize that in a free market, uncon-
strained by other forces, there is an obvious incentive to undertake
those precautions which cost less than the overall damage which
they prevent. 84 The incentive exists whether we use a fault based,
or a strict liability standard. One of the principal objects of any
system of compensation is to set the incentive level high enough to
prevent uneconomical losses without wasting resources on unneces-
sary precautions. When the Supreme Court ruled in Hydrolevel
that the antitrust laws contemplate vicarious corporate liability, it
clearly recognized the upward pressure on such incentives which it
81. See Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983). See also
Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24, 24 n.9. (N.D. Il. 1982).
82. See, e.g., A.B.A. Sec. of Crim. Justice, Report to the House of Delegates, § I
(commentary) (Aug. 1982); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
83. Much of this discussion draws from R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as R. POSNER]; But see Coffee, Corporate Crime
and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM.
CRlIM. L. REV. 419 (1980).
84. Id. at 122-23.
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was exerting.85
It can be argued that the incentive to prevent loss should be high-
est when one party to the transaction has a low (or no) capacity to
take the precautions necessary to prevent loss. Professor Posner86
has said that respondeat superior liability is particularly justified
where "potential victims of the injury are not in a good position to
make adjustments that might in the long run reduce or eliminate
the risk of injury."'8 7 Imagine for example, a small business trying
to protect itself from the possibility that five or six executives at a
large commercial bank are fraudulently keeping the prime interest
rate at higher than market level. 88 Yet, the spectre of vicarious
liability for the acts of those executives will constitute a powerful
economic incentive for the bank to police their activities.89 We tol-
erate an excess of incentive because there is little chance that poten-
tial victims can protect themselves adequately.
Second, strict liability has been justified on the basis that it places
ultimate responsibility on the party who is best able to spread the
risk. It is assumed usually that the cost of an accident, or any other
compensable loss, including the cost of insuring against the acci-
dent, can be spread more efficiently by a collective entity, than by
an individual. This may be only roughly true in an economy with
sophisticated insurance mechanisms, since even individuals can
spread a given risk through insurance. But a corporation can also
spread the cost of purchasing such insurance in a way which an
individual cannot. On balance, the allocation of risk argument sup-
ports imposing strict liability in many situations where relatively
large enterprises deal in the market place with relatively large num-
bers of indvidual users or buyers.
B. Enhanced Damages
From the perspective of the defendant, enhanced damages-de-
fined as more than actual damages-may function as punishment
for past activity or as a deterrent to future unlawful activity. It is
impossible to justify enhanced damages as punishment for past ac-
tivity except in a fault-based liability system; punishment without
fault makes no economic, or moral, sense.
85. American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572
(1982).
86. Now a judge of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
87. R. POSNER, supra note 83, at 140-41.
88. See, e.g., Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (1lth Cir.
1983).
89. It is not clear, however, that a fault-based standard would not be enough.
Strict liability only means that if neither the bank nor its customer can prevent fraud by
a bank employee, the loss should be shifted to the bank.
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However, modern jurisprudence increasingly recognizes en-
hanced damages as "a method to influence future behavior" rather
than as punishment. 90 Enhanced damages are particularly appro-
priate where the tortious conduct is concealable, since from the
tortfeasor's perspective the cost of engaging in the unlawful conduct
is reduced in proportion to the likelihood that those costs will not
be shifted from the injured party to the tortfeasor.9' The civil
RICO provisions have created a new cause of action for which "the
closest analogy is to an action in tort."' 92 Moreover, the predicate
crimes which constitute the core of RICO are, by and large, con-
cealable crimes. The fact that they are concealable tends to reduce
the chance that they will be discovered; thus, lowering the overall
cost of the racketeering activity to the perpetrator viewed ex-ante.
Enhanced damages, by increasing one variable in the equation, tend
to restore the balance, providing a deterrent to future unlawful
conduct.
In addition, it has been argued that where the damage consists, in
the main, of a forced transfer of wealth, enhanced damages are ap-
propriate to prevent the tortfeasor from bypassing the market-
place.93 A "racketeer" who is forced to do nothing more than
disgorge his ill-gotten gain, has no incentive not to engage in similar
activity in the future. His next takeover may go unchallenged.
Finally, since civil RICO relies on private enforcement, enhanced
damages provide an incentive to "scout up violations and enforce
legal rules.94 No doubt the attorney's fees provision of RICO was
also designed as an incentive to private enforcement. There is prob-
ably little to be said, economically, for the threefold multiplier,95
but it has historical precedent in the antitrust laws on which RICO
was modeled.
Some of the justifications for enhanced damages which make
sense in the context of direct liability, may make less sense in the
context of vicarious liability. For example, the fact that enhanced
damages deter transactions outside the marketplace will have very
little effect on the behavior of a person or entity whose liability is
derivative and who has not chosen in a meaningful sense to transact
any business at all. Yet, the damage provisions of the law do not
distinguish between cases of direct liability and cases of vicarious
90. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Forward: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 44 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook]
See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
91. See R. POSNER, supra note 83, at 143.
92. NSC Intern Corp. v. Ryan, 531 F. Supp. 362, 363 (W.D. Ill. 1981).
93. See R. POSNER, supra note 83, at 121-22.
94. Easterbrook, supra note 90, at 30; R. POSNER, supra note 79, at 462.
95. See R. POSNER, supra note 83, at 235.
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liability. With RICO, as with the antitrust laws, the treble damage
provision is justified on the basis that it provides the necessary in-
centive to private litigants to enforce the law. The incentive effect
does not recognize a distinction between direct and vicarious liabil-
ity since it focuses solely on the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
If there has been confusion about the reach of civil RICO, it is
because the Act imposes civil liability for criminal conduct in the
context of a statute which prohibits certain malum in se relation-
ships between a person and an enterprise. To this is added the fact
that both "person" and "enterprise" are expansively defined so that
the two concepts overlap substantially in the statute. The tests for
corporate civil liability under respondeat superior and corporate
criminal liability are certainly similar, but they are not the same.
The chief distinction is that corporate criminal responsibility nor-
mally requires an intent or purpose to benefit the corporation; cor-
porate civil liability extends to acts which have no purpose to
benefit the corporation so long as the corporate agent acts within
the scope of his apparent authority and, the transaction appears to
be regular from the perspective of a third party.
Vicarious civil liability under RICO can be supported on the
ground that neither the language of the statute nor its legislative
history suggests that the ordinary rules of agency-including liabil-
ity rules-have been displaced by RICO. This was precisely the
point made in Bernstein v. IDT Corp.96 Beyond that, however, vica-
rious civil liability can be supported on policy grounds in a great
number of potential RICO cases which result in economic injury to
persons or businesses outside of the defendant corporation. To the
extent that RICO cases are brought in conjunction with other fed-
eral or pendent state claims, there will be respondeat superior liabil-
ity in any event. It may not be treble damage liability, but as noted
above, enhanced damages are primarily an incentive to private par-
ties to enforce the law. The basis for that liability is irrelevant to
the incentive.
Moreover, whatever the basis for imposing civil liability, RICO
requires proof of criminal conduct. That fact alone should tend to
limit the number of cases raising RICO exposure. The current "ex-
plosion" 97 of RICO litigation is, in many respects, just a relocation
of commercial tort litigation from the state to the federal courts.
The relocation may or may not make sense on economic and polit-
96. Bernstein, 582 F. Supp. at 1083.
97. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486.
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ical grounds, but it makes no sense to tamper with recognized rules
of liability solely in an effort to curb federal litigation.98
All of this is not to say that other rules are not possible. One
alternative would be to impose civil liability on a corporation only if
the corporation, as well as its agents, would have criminal liability
under section 1962 for the activity in question. This was the sug-
gested approach of the Haroco court.99 Of course, it is not vicarious
liability at all, since it requires a finding of corporate complicity
sufficient to satisfy section 1962(a). However, since corporate crimi-
nal liability is itself a species of vicarious liability, a rule like that
suggested in Haroco would nonetheless take some account of the
various factors which bear on whether a corporation should be
called to answer for the acts of its agents. 100 From a policy stand-
point, it is not beyond debate that the traditional rules for imposing
civil liability on corporations are "fairer" than the rules imposing
criminal liability, or that they result in a more efficient allocation of
resources ex ante. 101
The argument that a corporation, as a victim of racketeering ac-
tivity, should not be responsible to innocent third parties who may
have been victimized by the same activity is, for the most part, be-
side the point. In most cases where a corporation pays damages for
the tortious acts of its agents it has a right of subrogation against
98. See id. at 487 ("The problem with RICO is not the explosion of federal litiga-
tion. Congress is of course free to create federal causes of action for civil litigants within
constitutional limits not in question here").
99. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 401-02.
100. Perhaps the most carefully considered modem theory of corporate criminal
liability is that embodied in the Model Penal Code. In general, it imposes liability on a
corporation in three situations: 1) if a corporate agent violates a law while acting on
behalf of the corporation within the scope of his agency and if the law plainly evinces a
legislative intent to impose criminal liability on corporations; or 2) if a corporate agent
fails to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by
law; or 3) when the commission of any offense is authorized, requested, or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or a high managerial agent (as defined) acting in
behalf of the corporation in the scope of his agency. A.L.I., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.07 (P.O.D. 1962).
101. For a thorough discussion of the common law development of corporate crimi-
nal responsibility, see Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 254-81, 275
N.E.2d 33, 71-86 (1971). Beneficial Finance involved a fact pattern not unlike some of
the so-called "prime rate" cases brought under RICO today. See Haroco Inc. v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984). In Beneficial Finance, the
Supreme Judicial Court concluded as follows:
Considering everything we have said above, we are of opinion that the
quantum of proof necessary to sustain the conviction of a corporation for the
acts of its agents is sufficiently met if it is shown that the corporation has
placed the agent in a position where he has enough authority and responsibil-
ity to act for and in behalf of the corporation in handling the particular corpo-
rate business, operation or project in which he was engaged at the time he
committed the criminal act.
Beneficial Finance, 360 Mass. at 280, 275 N.E.2d at 86.
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the agent. If the corporation can show injury apart from its vicari-
ous liability, it will usually have an independent claim against its
agent. The courts are quite competent to adjust rights among par-
ties some of whom have personal liability, or derivative liability, or
who are innocent. The fact that a malfeasant corporate agent may
be impecunious is just a detail. We permit vicarious corporate lia-
bility in many other situations where the right of subrogation is
practically worthless.
The task at hand is to identify the proper framework for analysis
of the vicarious liability issues under RICO. The person/enterprise
structure of the statute does not change the ordinary common law
rules governing the liability of a principal for the acts of his agents.
When liability questions are considered against this framework, the
answers will follow. If the results are unexpected, or if they seem
wholly out of proportion to the injury over the range of cases, then
and only then will it be appropriate to change the rules.
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